There are many men of principle in both parties in America, but there is no party of principle.

Alexis de Tocqueville made this observation while analyzing the early American party system in the 1830s, during the period he traveled in the United States (1831–1832) and later wrote Democracy in America. In his discussion of political parties, Tocqueville distinguishes between “great” parties rooted in fundamental principles and “small” parties driven more by interests, personalities, and tactical disputes. He argues that, in the relatively stable constitutional order of the United States after the founding era, party conflict often centered less on first principles than on practical administration and competition for office—hence his claim that principled individuals existed across factions, but that no party consistently embodied principle as its organizing core.

The remark separates personal virtue from institutional behavior. Tocqueville suggests that individuals may act from conscience and coherent political philosophy, yet parties—because they must aggregate diverse voters, bargain, and win power—tend to dilute or subordinate principle to coalition maintenance and expediency. The line also implies a critique of partisan identity: moral seriousness is not monopolized by any faction, and citizens should be wary of treating party labels as proxies for ethical or philosophical commitments. More broadly, it reflects Tocqueville’s concern that democratic politics can encourage short-term calculation and interest-group bargaining, making it difficult for enduring principles to guide collective action.