The first law for the historian is that he shall never dare utter an untruth. The second is that he shall suppress nothing that is true. Moreover, there shall be no suspicion of partiality in his writing, or of malice.

This maxim is attributed to Cicero in connection with his reflections on the writing of history in the late Roman Republic, a period when historical narratives were often entangled with factional politics, personal enmities, and the pursuit of reputation. Cicero—an orator, statesman, and theorist of rhetoric—repeatedly stresses that history should be governed by moral and rhetorical standards: truthfulness, completeness, and an appearance (and reality) of impartiality. The sentiment is commonly linked to his discussion of historiography in his rhetorical dialogue *De Oratore*, where he contrasts mere partisan advocacy with the historian’s obligation to truth and fairness.

Cicero frames historiography as an ethical discipline with two core duties: never to state what is false and never to omit what is true. The added requirement—avoiding any suspicion of bias or malice—recognizes that credibility depends not only on factual accuracy but also on the writer’s perceived motives. The historian must therefore resist the temptations of propaganda, revenge, and self-serving selection of evidence. The passage anticipates later ideals of historical method: candor, completeness, and impartial judgment. It also implies that history is a public trust: the historian’s authority rests on integrity, not merely eloquence.