Men are disturbed not by things, but by the view which they take of them.

This maxim comes from the Stoic tradition associated with Epictetus (c. 50–135 CE), a former slave turned philosopher whose teachings were recorded by his student Arrian. In the early sections of the Enchiridion (a short handbook distilled from Epictetus’s lectures), Epictetus lays out a foundational Stoic distinction: some things are “up to us” (our judgments, impulses, desires) and others are not (external events, other people, reputation, health). The line is used to train students to locate the source of distress in their own interpretations rather than in events themselves, thereby cultivating resilience and moral agency amid uncertainty.

Epictetus argues that suffering is not mechanically produced by external circumstances but by the judgments we attach to them—our beliefs about what an event “means” and whether it is good or bad. The quote encapsulates Stoic cognitive ethics: by examining and revising our impressions, we can reduce fear, anger, and grief, and respond more rationally and virtuously. It does not deny that events can be painful; rather, it claims that the destabilizing element is the evaluative story we tell ourselves. The saying has had a long afterlife in moral philosophy and modern cognitive approaches to emotion, emphasizing responsibility for one’s inner life.

“It is not things themselves that disturb men, but their judgments about these things.”
“Men are not disturbed by things, but by the principles and notions which they form concerning things.”
“People are disturbed not by events, but by their view of them.”