Death is nothing to us, since when we are, death has not come, and when death has come, we are not.

This maxim is associated with Epicurus’ ethical teaching in the early Hellenistic period (late 4th–early 3rd century BCE), where he argued that philosophy should cure mental distress. A central target was the pervasive fear of death, which Epicurus saw as a major obstacle to ataraxia (tranquility). The thought is preserved not in a surviving work by Epicurus himself but in later testimony, especially in a letter summarizing Epicurean doctrine. In that setting, the argument functions as a therapeutic reminder: because death entails the absence of sensation, it cannot be experienced as harm by the person who dies, and thus should not be feared as a present evil.

Epicurus’ point is not that death is pleasant or desirable, but that it is not something we can ever encounter as a subject of experience. All good and bad, he claims, consist in sensation; death is the privation of sensation. Therefore, fearing death mistakes an abstract future state for a felt injury. The aphorism aims to dissolve anxiety by separating the idea of death from the lived reality of suffering. It also underwrites Epicurean moderation: once fear of divine punishment and postmortem torment is removed, one can pursue stable pleasures—friendship, simple needs, and peace of mind—without being driven by dread of an afterlife or by frantic attempts to “outrun” mortality.

“Death is nothing to us; for that which is dissolved is without sensation, and that which lacks sensation is nothing to us.”
“Accustom thyself to believe that death is nothing to us; for all good and evil consist in sensation, and death is the privation of sensation.”
“Where I am, death is not; where death is, I am not.”