The Establishment Clause prohibits government from making adherence to a religion relevant in any way to a person’s standing in the political community.

This sentence is associated with Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence, especially her “endorsement” framework, which asks whether government action sends a message that nonadherents are outsiders and adherents are favored members of the community. O’Connor used this idea in cases involving religious symbols and government-sponsored religious expression, where the Court evaluated whether official practices effectively made religious identity a civic credential. The formulation reflects her effort to articulate the Establishment Clause as a protection of equal political citizenship—guarding against state actions that tie belonging, legitimacy, or access to the political community to religious adherence.

O’Connor’s point is that the Constitution bars the state from treating religion as a marker of civic worth. Government may not structure public life so that being (or not being) religious affects one’s perceived legitimacy as a citizen—whether through official prayers, religious displays, or policies that signal preference for particular faiths. The emphasis on “standing in the political community” frames Establishment Clause harm as a form of political inequality: when the state endorses religion, it risks branding nonadherents as second-class participants in public life. The quote thus links church–state separation to equal citizenship and social inclusion, not merely institutional neutrality.