Is God willing to prevent evil, but not able? Then he is not omnipotent. Is he able, but not willing? Then he is malevolent. Is he both able and willing? Then whence cometh evil? Is he neither able nor willing? Then why call him God?

Although widely attributed to Epicurus, this “problem of evil” formulation does not survive in any extant writing by him. Epicurus (3rd c. BCE) did argue that the gods exist but are blessed, immortal, and not involved in human affairs—views that later critics saw as undermining providence. The specific fourfold dilemma is known to us through later transmission: it is reported in early modern scholarship as a summary of Epicurean reasoning and is often linked (indirectly) to ancient discussions preserved by later authors. The most frequently cited conduit is the 17th‑century writer Pierre Bayle, who presents it as an Epicurean argument in his influential reference work.

This set of questions formulates the classic “problem of evil” as a logical dilemma: the coexistence of evil with a deity defined as both omnipotent and perfectly good appears inconsistent. By exhausting the combinations of ability and willingness, the argument pressures theistic claims to revise at least one attribute (power, goodness, or providential concern) or to explain evil’s presence through some additional premise (e.g., free will, soul-making, inscrutable divine purposes). Although widely attributed to Epicurus, the passage is best treated as a later summary of an Epicurean challenge to providence rather than a verbatim surviving quotation. Its enduring significance lies in how cleanly it frames a central issue in philosophy of religion.

1) “Is he willing to prevent evil, but not able? then is he impotent. Is he able, but not willing? then is he malevolent. Is he both able and willing? whence then is evil? Is he neither able nor willing? why then call him God?”
2) “If God is willing to prevent evil but cannot, he is not omnipotent; if he can but is not willing, he is malevolent; if he can and will, why is there evil; if he neither can nor will, why call him God?”