We are, I know not how, double in ourselves, so that what we believe we disbelieve and cannot rid ourselves of what we condemn.

This remark is characteristic of Montaigne’s Essays (first published 1580; expanded in later editions), where he repeatedly examines the instability and self-contradiction of human judgment. Writing in late-16th-century France amid religious conflict and political volatility, Montaigne turns inward rather than offering dogmatic systems, using introspection to show how the mind can hold opposed impulses at once. The line reflects his broader skepticism about the reliability of reason and the will: even when we assent to an idea or condemn a habit, we often find ourselves pulled by contrary beliefs, passions, and ingrained dispositions that do not yield to simple resolution.

Montaigne describes a divided self: our conscious beliefs and moral verdicts do not fully govern what we feel, desire, or do. The “double” nature of the person means conviction is shadowed by doubt, and condemnation by lingering attachment. Rather than treating this as mere weakness, Montaigne uses it to undermine pretensions to certainty and to encourage intellectual humility. The quote suggests that self-knowledge must include acknowledging internal conflict—how habit, appetite, and imagination can persist even against our stated principles. It also implies a tolerant view of human inconsistency: moral life is not a clean alignment of belief and action but an ongoing negotiation within a fractured psyche.