I say to the Taliban: surrender the terrorists or surrender power. It’s your choice.

Tony Blair issued this ultimatum in the immediate aftermath of the 11 September 2001 attacks, as the UK aligned itself with the United States in demanding that Afghanistan’s Taliban government hand over Osama bin Laden and other al‑Qaeda figures. The statement belongs to Blair’s public case for action against the Taliban: that the regime was knowingly sheltering and enabling an international terrorist network, and that refusal to cooperate would bring military and diplomatic consequences. It reflects the atmosphere of urgency in late September 2001, when Western leaders framed the coming campaign in Afghanistan as a necessary response to terrorism rather than a conventional war of choice.

The line compresses Blair’s argument into a stark either/or: the Taliban must either sever ties with transnational terrorism by surrendering those responsible, or forfeit its legitimacy and control. Rhetorically, it removes middle ground—no negotiation, no partial compliance—casting the issue as a moral and security imperative. The phrasing also shifts responsibility for escalation onto the Taliban: if power is “surrendered,” it is presented as the consequence of their choice, not Western preference. In quotation databases, it is often cited as emblematic of post‑9/11 political language that fused counterterrorism aims with regime-change implications.