Appear weak when you are strong, and strong when you are weak.

This maxim is attributed to Sun Tzu’s Art of War, a Chinese military treatise traditionally dated to the late Spring and Autumn period (often placed around the 5th century BCE). It appears in the portion of the work concerned with “emptiness and fullness” (xu/shi)—how commanders manipulate an enemy’s perceptions through concealment, feints, and the control of information. In the text’s broader strategic framework, victory depends less on brute force than on shaping conditions before battle: misleading the opponent about one’s capabilities, intentions, and readiness so that the enemy misallocates forces or exposes vulnerabilities.

The line encapsulates Sun Tzu’s emphasis on deception as a force multiplier. To “appear weak” when strong is to invite overconfidence, draw an opponent into disadvantageous action, or induce them to disperse their strength. To “appear strong” when weak is to deter attack, buy time, or channel the enemy toward safer avenues. The point is not mere trickery but strategic control of perception: by managing what the adversary believes, one can influence what the adversary does. In modern usage, the aphorism is often generalized to negotiation, competition, and politics, where signaling and misdirection can shape outcomes without direct confrontation.

When able to attack, we must seem unable; when using our forces, we must seem inactive; when we are near, we must make the enemy believe we are far away; when far away, we must make him believe we are near.