If we don't believe in freedom of expression for people we despise, we don't believe in it at all.

The line is widely associated with Noam Chomsky’s defense of civil liberties in the late–Cold War U.S., especially amid controversies over whether extremist or hateful speakers should be denied platforms. It is most often linked to debates around “free speech for the speech we hate,” including public arguments over the rights of political pariahs (frequently invoked in connection with the Faurisson affair in France, where Chomsky defended procedural free-speech rights while rejecting the views at issue). In this setting, the remark functions as a litmus test: commitment to free expression is meaningful only when it protects unpopular, offensive, or despised speech, not merely speech one approves of.

The statement frames free expression as a principle tested at its hardest edge: protecting speech you hate. If one defends speech only for allies or respectable opinions, the “principle” collapses into mere preference or factional advantage. Chomsky’s formulation also implies that censorship is most tempting when directed at despised groups, so a society’s real commitment to liberty is measured by whether it restrains that impulse. The quote thus functions as a moral and political litmus test: freedom of expression is not primarily about celebrating agreeable ideas, but about maintaining a rule that prevents majorities, institutions, or governments from silencing stigmatized minorities.