Europeans often ask, and Americans do not always explain, how it happens that this great office [the presidency], the greatest in the world, unless we except the Papacy, to which any man can rise by his own merits, is not more frequently filled by great and striking men.

James Bryce (1838–1922), a British jurist, historian, and Liberal politician, wrote this observation while analyzing the U.S. presidency for European readers in the late 19th century. In his influential study of American institutions, Bryce tries to explain why the presidency—seemingly the most powerful elective office open to talent—so often goes to candidates who appear, from abroad, less “great and striking” than the office’s stature might suggest. The remark reflects Bryce’s comparative perspective (European monarchies and the papacy as reference points) and his focus on party machinery, nomination processes, and the incentives of mass democracy in shaping who becomes president.

Bryce is probing a paradox: an office of immense authority and global prestige is, in his view, not consistently occupied by the most eminent statesmen. The quote implies that the selection of presidents is constrained less by the formal constitutional design than by political realities—party organizations, the need to satisfy diverse coalitions, and the preference for “safe” nominees who will not fracture a party. By comparing the presidency to the papacy, Bryce underscores how rare it is for a person to rise so high without hereditary right—yet he suggests that democratic competition can reward manageability and electability over brilliance. The passage is thus a critique of political incentives rather than of the office itself.