There is no such thing as justice in the abstract it is merely a compact between men.

Epicurus (341–270 BCE) developed an ethical philosophy centered on achieving tranquility (ataraxia) through modest pleasures, freedom from fear, and prudent living. In his surviving “Principal Doctrines” (Kyriai Doxai), he treats justice not as a divine or metaphysical absolute but as a human arrangement grounded in mutual advantage: people agree not to harm one another because it promotes security and peace of mind. This view reflects Epicurus’s broader naturalism and his rejection of supernatural foundations for morality and law. The sentiment is typically associated with the Epicurean maxims on justice (often numbered 31–38), preserved indirectly through later doxographical and manuscript traditions.

The quote expresses a conventionalist, contract-like account of justice: “justice” is not an abstract entity existing independently of human life, but a practical agreement among people to refrain from harming one another. Its authority comes from its usefulness—especially the safety and stability it provides—rather than from divine command or eternal moral forms. On this reading, laws and norms are justified insofar as they serve mutual benefit; when circumstances change and an arrangement no longer benefits those bound by it, it loses its claim to be “just.” Epicurus thus ties morality to human needs and social peace, making justice instrumental to the good life rather than an end in itself.