It seemed that rebellion must have an unassailable base, something guarded not merely from attack, but from the fear of it: such a base as we had in the Red Sea Parts, the desert, or in the minds of the men we converted to our creed.

This line reflects T. E. Lawrence’s thinking during the Arab Revolt (1916–1918), when he served as a British liaison and strategist alongside Hashemite Arab forces against the Ottoman Empire. Lawrence repeatedly emphasized that the revolt’s strength lay less in holding conventional territory than in exploiting spaces the enemy could not easily penetrate or even confidently threaten—vast deserts, coastal inlets, and, crucially, the allegiance and morale of local fighters. In his wartime memoir he contrasts orthodox military “bases” (ports, depots, fixed lines) with the insurgent advantage of mobility and political conversion, arguing that the safest sanctuary for rebellion can be geographic remoteness and an internalized commitment among supporters.

Lawrence argues that successful rebellion depends on a “base” that is secure not only from direct assault but from the constant anxiety of vulnerability. He broadens the idea of a base beyond fortifications and supply depots to include terrain that nullifies an enemy’s strengths (the desert’s scale and emptiness) and, more profoundly, the psychological and ideological commitment of people won to the cause. The quote captures his insurgency logic: if the enemy cannot reliably locate, fix, and destroy you—and if your supporters carry the cause in their minds—then rebellion becomes resilient. It is an early, influential articulation of irregular warfare as political persuasion plus strategic mobility.