A conventional army loses if it does not win. The guerrilla army wins if it does not lose.

Henry Kissinger formulated this maxim while analyzing insurgency and counterinsurgency dynamics in the mid–20th century, especially the political-military logic of “wars of national liberation” that shaped conflicts such as Vietnam and Algeria. In his writing on limited war and revolutionary warfare, Kissinger emphasized that conventional forces are judged by their ability to deliver decisive, visible victories, whereas guerrillas can treat mere survival as success because it sustains the political narrative, exhausts the opponent, and keeps open the possibility of eventual takeover. The line is typically cited in discussions of why technologically superior armies can struggle against insurgents when strategic goals are political rather than purely military.

Kissinger’s aphorism contrasts the asymmetric “win conditions” of conventional versus guerrilla warfare. Regular armies are judged by decisive victories—taking and holding territory, destroying enemy forces, and producing clear political outcomes—so stalemate or protracted conflict is experienced as failure. Guerrilla forces, by contrast, can treat mere survival as success: if they avoid annihilation, they can continue to sap the opponent’s will, resources, and legitimacy over time. The line captures a central strategic dilemma of counterinsurgency: the stronger side must win convincingly and quickly enough to justify costs, while the weaker side can aim to endure, erode resolve, and convert time into political advantage.