We know that there are unaccounted-for Scud and other ballistic missiles in Iraq. And part of the problem is that, since 1998, there has been no way to even get minimal information about those programs except through intelligence means.

Condoleezza Rice made this remark during the George W. Bush administration’s public case that Saddam Hussein’s Iraq retained prohibited weapons capabilities and delivery systems. After UN weapons inspectors left Iraq in 1998, U.S. officials argued that the absence of on-the-ground inspections created an information vacuum, forcing reliance on intelligence reporting. The statement reflects a recurring pre–Iraq War theme in late 2002–early 2003: that Iraq’s past use and concealment of missiles and WMD-related programs, combined with gaps in verification, justified heightened concern and possible military action. It also invokes the issue of “unaccounted-for” Scud missiles from the 1991 Gulf War era.

The quote frames uncertainty as evidence of danger: because inspectors were not present after 1998, Rice argues that the international community could not reliably verify what Iraq possessed, and that intelligence indications of “unaccounted-for” missiles should be treated as a serious threat. Rhetorically, it shifts the burden of proof—lack of transparent information becomes a reason to assume the worst rather than to suspend judgment. The line also illustrates how the Bush administration linked Iraq’s prior missile inventory and concealment practices to contemporary risk assessments, emphasizing delivery systems (ballistic missiles) as a concrete, militarily salient category even when specific stockpiles could not be publicly demonstrated.