Those who know how to win are more numerous than those who know how to make proper use of their victories.

Polybius, writing his Histories in the mid–2nd century BCE, repeatedly contrasts tactical success in war with the rarer capacity for prudent statecraft afterward. The sentiment fits his recurring analysis of how powers rise and fall: victory creates new political problems—governing allies, restraining vengeance, consolidating gains, and avoiding overreach—that can undo battlefield achievements. In his narrative of Mediterranean hegemonies (especially Rome’s expansion and the missteps of its rivals), Polybius treats “using victory well” as a test of character and institutions, not merely generalship. The line is commonly cited in modern collections as a distilled maxim from this broader moral-political outlook.

Polybius contrasts tactical success with strategic wisdom: many can achieve victory, but far fewer can convert it into durable advantage. The remark reflects a historian’s interest in causes and consequences—how states rise or fall not merely by winning battles but by managing power afterward through restraint, policy, and institutions. Implicit is a warning against triumphalism: victory can tempt leaders into overreach, harsh settlements, or complacency, which may sow future instability. The line also fits Polybius’s broader moral-political outlook that prudence (phronesis) and disciplined governance matter as much as martial prowess in sustaining a hegemonic position.